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Abstract
In the context of school choice, we experimentally study the student-optimal stable mechanism
where subjects take the role of students and schools are passive. Specifically, we study if a
school can be better off when it unambiguously improves in the students’ true preferences
and its (theoretic) student-optimal stable match remains the same or gets worse. Using first-
order stochastic dominance to evaluate the schools’ distributions over their actual matches,
we find that schools’ welfare almost always changes in the same direction as the change of the
student-optimal stable matching, i.e., incentives to improve school quality are nearly idle.
Keywords: school choice, matching, deferred acceptance, school quality, stability.
JEL–Numbers: C78, C91, C92, D78, I20.
1 Introduction
In many public school choice programs over the world children are assigned to public schools on
the basis of (parents’) preferences and the priorities of children for different schools (based on,
e.g., walking distance, siblings, etc.). Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez (2003) advocate the use of
centralized mechanisms, and in particular the student-optimal stable mechanism.1 In this context,
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1This is the mechanism based on the deferred algorithm (Gale and Shapley, 1962) where students make proposals
to schools. See also Roth (2008).
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Hatfield et al. (2016) consider the incentives for schools to improve their quality. A mechanism
is said to respect improvements of school quality if a school becomes better off whenever that
school improves, i.e., becomes more preferred by students. Hatfield et al. (Proposition 1, 2016)
show that there is no stable mechanism that respects improvements of school quality at every
school preference profile.2 Their analysis assumes that students reveal their preferences truthfully,
i.e., report the ranking that coincides with their true preferences. This assumption seems quite
reasonable for the student-optimal stable mechanism as it is known to be strategy-proof.
However, the experimental literature has shown that under the student-optimal stable mech-
anism subjects do not always realize that it is in their best interest to reveal their preferences
truthfully. For instance, the reported truth-telling rates are between 57% and 58% in Calsamiglia
et al. (2010), 64% in Chen and Sönmez (2006), between 44% and 65% in Klijn et al. (2013), and
between 67% and 82% in Pais and Pintér (2008).3 There is also literature that uses field data and
makes this observation, e.g., Chen and Pereyra (2019) and Fack et al. (2019) on the Mexico city and
Paris high-school match, respectively, Hassidim et al. (2018) on the admission process on graduate
studies in psychology in Israel, Rees-Jones (2018) on the matching of medical students to residen-
cies in the US, and Shorrer and Sóvágó (2017) on the Hungarian college admissions.4 Consequently,
theoretical findings on the student-optimal stable mechanism that hinge on its strategy-proofness
may not carry over to real-life applications. So, laboratory and field experiments seem necessary
to test theory and provide further important insights.
In view of the above, we focus on the student-optimal stable mechanism and study whether the
negative finding of Hatfield et al. (Proposition 1, 2016) also holds in the laboratory. We construct
related school choice problems such that some school improves in the students’ true preferences
yet the (theoretic) student-optimal stable match is worse or the same. Our main result is that
this type of improvement in the students’ true preferences can indeed decrease the quality of the
school’s actual match. In fact, the distribution of students that are matched to the school after
its improvement in the students’ true preferences is often first-order stochastically dominated by
the initial distribution.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the experimental design,
hypotheses, and procedures. In Section 3, we present and discuss our experimental results. The
detailed experimental instructions are relegated to the Online Appendix.
2 Laboratory experiment
Design and Hypotheses
The experiment is based on four matching problems where students i1, i2, i3, and i4 each seek to
obtain a seat at schools s1, s2, s3, and s4. Each school offers exactly one seat. The preferences of
the students and the priorities of the schools in the four problems are depicted in Table 1.
2Considering a sequence of random markets that are “regular” and “sufficiently thick” and grow infinitely large,
Hatfield et al. (Theorem 1, 2016) show that all stable mechanisms strongly respect improvements of school quality.
3Moreover, in a recent experimental study, Guillen and Veszteg (2019) show that much of the observed truth-
telling comes from confused decision-makers following a default, very focal strategy.
4Another strand of literature explores factors behind the play of dominated strategies in strategy-proof environ-
ments. See, e.g., Basteck and Mantovani (2018) and Rees-Jones and Skowronek (2018) for cognitive ability.
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Problem 1 Preferences Priorities
i1 i2 i3 i4 s1 s2 s3 s4
Best match s2 s4 s4 s2 i2 i2 i4 i4
Second best s3 s3 s1 s1 i1 i3 i3 i1
Third best s4 s1 s2 s3 i3 i4 i1 i2
Worst match s1 s2 s3 s4 i4 i1 i2 i3
Problem 2 Preferences Priorities
i1 i2 i3 i4 s1 s2 s3 s4
Best match s2 s3 s4 s1 i2 i2 i4 i4
Second best s3 s4 s1 s2 i1 i3 i3 i1
Third best s4 s1 s2 s3 i3 i4 i1 i2
Worst match s1 s2 s3 s4 i4 i1 i2 i3
Problem 3 Preferences Priorities
i1 i2 i3 i4 s1 s2 s3 s4
Best match s2 s4 s4 s2 i2 i2 i4 i4
Second best s4 s1 s1 s1 i1 i3 i3 i1
Third best s3 s3 s2 s3 i3 i4 i1 i2
Worst match s1 s2 s3 s4 i4 i1 i2 i3
Problem 4 Preferences Priorities
i1 i2 i3 i4 s1 s2 s3 s4
Best match s2 s4 s4 s1 i2 i2 i4 i4
Second best s3 s3 s1 s2 i1 i3 i3 i1
Third best s4 s1 s2 s3 i3 i4 i1 i2
Worst match s1 s2 s3 s4 i4 i1 i2 i3
Table 1: Students’ preferences over schools and schools’ priorities over students. The underlined matches
constitute the student-optimal stable matchings. The bold-faced entries highlight the differences between
preference profiles P 1 and P 3 (indicated in P 3), P 1 and P 4 (indicated in P 4), and P 2 and P 4 (indicated
in P 2).
The four problems were constructed in such a way that they satisfy the following three proper-
ties. First, the priorities are identical in all four problems, which simplifies the task for experimental
subjects as they all take the role of students and it allows us to compare for each school outcomes
across problems.
Second, the problems allow for a unanimous comparison of the student-optimal stable matchings
by the schools, which we explain next. For each k = 1, 2, 3, 4 and each school s, let µk(s) denote
the student-optimal stable match of school s at problem k.5 The underlined matches in Table 1
depict the student-optimal stable matchings. We assume that the priorities of the schools reflect
their preferences, i.e., obtaining a higher priority student is preferred to a lower priority student.
For every school s, let s (s) denote the strict (associated weak) preference relation.
Observation I: The schools rank the four student-optimal stable matchings in the same order:
for each school s, µ3(s) s µ1(s) = µ4(s) s µ2(s).
Third, the problems only slightly differ in preferences to study the effect of school improvements,
which we explain next. For k = 1, 2, 3, 4, let P k denote the students’ strict preferences in problem k.
Let k, l ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, k 6= l. Following Hatfield et al. (2016), we say that a school s∗ improves (in
the students’ true preferences) moving from P k to P l if
i1. for each student i and each school s 6= s∗, s∗P ki s ⇒ s∗P li s;
i2. for each student i and any two schools s, s′ 6= s∗, sP ki s′ ⇔ sP li s′.
The bold-faced entries in Table 1 and Observation I help to identify the differences between
preference profiles and to verify the following observation.
5We refer to the Online Appendix, Gale and Shapley (1962), and Roth (2008) for a description of the deferred
acceptance algorithm to calculate the student-optimal stable matchings.
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Observation II: There are exactly four situations (s, P k, P l) where school s improves in the
students’ preferences moving from P k to P l but µk(s) s µl(s). These situations are
a. (s3, P 3, P 1): school s3 improves from P 3 to P 1 but µ3(s3) s3 µ1(s3);
b. (s1, P 1, P 4): school s1 improves from P 1 to P 4 but µ1(s1) = µ4(s1);
c. (s2, P 4, P 1): school s2 improves from P 4 to P 1 but µ4(s2) = µ1(s2);
d. (s3, P 4, P 2): school s3 improves from P 4 to P 2 but µ4(s3) s3 µ2(s3).
If subjects are mostly truth-telling (whether or not being aware of strategy-proofness), then
we should expect the actual matchings to be “close” to the student-optimal stable matchings so
that the school improvements identified in situations a.–d. in Observation II do not lead to better
actual matches for the schools.
Hypothesis H0: Each improvement of a school in the students’ true preferences identified in
Observation II does not lead to a better actual match for the school.
On the other hand, in view of evidence from the experimental literature on the student-optimal
stable mechanism, we can expect a substantial number of subjects to not truthfully reveal their
preferences. Then, given that the school improvements described in Observation II are minimal
and straightforward in the sense that only one school improves, one can conjecture that the actual
match of the school improves.
Hypothesis H1: Each improvement of a school in the students’ true preferences identified in
Observation II leads to a better actual match for the school.
Procedures
The experiment was programmed within the z-Tree toolbox provided by Fischbacher (2007) and
carried out at Lineex (www.lineex.es) hosted at the University of Valencia. In total, 96 undergrad-
uates participated in the experiment. We ran two sessions with 48 subjects. At the beginning of
each session, subjects were randomly assigned into groups of four. Within each group, one subject
was assigned the role of student i1, another subject the role of student i2, and so forth. Groups
and roles did not change over the course of the experiment.
Participants were told that the experiment would take a total of 24 rounds and that preferences
and priorities would change every six rounds. In both sessions, rounds 1 to 6 used preferences and
priorities of problem 1, rounds 7 to 12 used preferences and priorities of problem 2, rounds 13
to 18 used those of problem 3, and rounds 19 to 24 used those of problem 4.6 Before the first
round, subjects went individually over an illustrative example in order to get used to the matching
procedure. Afterwards, we implemented a trial round that was not taken into account for payment
and that helped subjects to get familiar with the computer software. The problem played in the
trial round 0 was different from problems 1–4. At the beginning of each of the 24 rounds, the
computer screen presented the preferences of all group members and the priorities of the four
schools. Subjects took then their respective decisions.
At the end of each round, each subject got to know his/her match and corresponding payoff. No
explicit information about the behavior or the outcome of the other group members was provided.
6Note that this avoids that any two pairs of problems that we compare (as discussed in the design section,
namely {P 1, P 3}, {P 1, P 4}, and {P 2, P 4}) be played consecutively.
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At the end of the experiment, one round was randomly selected for payment. Subjects received
24, 20, 16, and 12 experimental currency units (ECU) if they ended up in their most, second
most, third most, and least preferred school. Each ECU was worth 1 Euro. A session lasted about
120 minutes and subjects earned on average 23.50 Euro for their participation including a 3 Euro
show-up fee. The detailed experimental instructions are relegated to the Online Appendix.
3 Results
In previous laboratory experiments it has been observed that a substantial part of subjects do not
play the weakly dominant strategy of truth-telling. As Figure 1 shows, this is also the case in our
experiment.
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Figure 1: Truth-telling (upper panel) and average payoff (lower panel). The horizontal bars indicate the
average payoff at the corresponding student-optimal stable matching.
More precisely, the average truth-telling rates are 57.12%, 70.13%, 41.45%, and 73.09% in
problems 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively. It can be observed that repetition leads to higher truth-
telling rates in all problems but problem 3. Repetition also has an effect on the average payoff,
which is depicted in the lower panel of Figure 1. In problem 1, the average payoff is initially well
below the average payoff at the student-optimal stable matching, but repetition helps to close this
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gap. There are no visible learning effects for the other three problems. In comparison with the
average payoff at the student-optimal stable matching, the average payoff in the experiment is far
smaller in problem 2, slightly higher7 in problem 3, and slightly smaller in problem 4.
We now turn to our hypotheses, which concern the effect of a school improvement (in the
true students’ preferences) on the actual student the school receives. Since the preferences of
each school are fixed throughout, it is possible to make comparisons between the distributions
over actual matches that the school receives at different problems. A distribution over matches
can be conveniently described as follows. Given a school s, for ` = 1, 2, 3, 4, let qs(`) denote
the (cumulative) probability with which school s receives a match that is ranked `-th or worse
(below). For example, qs2(3) is the probability that school s2 receives student i1 (ranked 4-th) or
i4 (ranked 3-rd). Note that for each school s, qs(1) = 1. Then, a cumulative distribution function
can be described by the vector qs = (qs(4), qs(3), qs(2), 1), which consists of four weakly increasing
probabilities. Figure 2 depicts in each panel the cumulative distribution functions obtained in
the four problems for the corresponding school. The cumulative distribution function for school
s in problem k = 1, 2, 3, 4, denoted qks , is calculated from the actual matches of school s in all
experimental groups and all rounds in which problem k was played. For instance, q1s2(3) ≈ 0.85.
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Figure 2: Cumulative distribution functions qks for each school s and each problem k = 1, 2, 3, 4.
7This is possible because in problem 3 there are (unstable) matchings that Pareto-dominate the student-optimal
stable matching.
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To obtain the strongest possible conclusions concerning the evaluation of a school’s matches,
we do not make further assumptions on the intensity of the schools’ preferences. In particular,
we do not assume any particular utility functions for the schools. Then, to compare distributions
over matches for a given school, a natural but demanding tool is that of first-order stochastic
dominance. A cumulative distribution function q first-order stochastically dominates another cu-
mulative distribution function q˜, denoted by q FOSD q˜, if for each ` = 1, 2, 3, 4, q(`) ≤ q˜(`) and
for some ` = 2, 3, 4, q(`) < q˜(`). In Figure 2, for any school and any two cumulative distribution
functions q and q˜, q FOSD q˜ if and only if the graph of q lies below that of q˜. Our findings are
as follows.
Result: With respect to the situations exhibited in Observation II,
a. q3s3 FOSD q1s3 ;
b. q1s1 6FOSD q4s1 and q4s1 6FOSD q1s1 ;
c. q1s2 FOSD q4s2 ;
d. q4s3 FOSD q2s3 .
In short, cases a, b, and d support the null hypothesis H0, while case c supports the alternative
hypothesis H1. However, given that the order of play is 1, 2, 3, and 4, the finding in case c could
be due to learning: if the decisions of the subjects are better at problem 4 than at problem 1,
as suggested by the increased truth-telling rates in Figure 1, then schools could be expected to
be worse off at problem 4.8 All in all, we reject the alternative hypothesis H1. So, in line with
Hatfield et al. (Proposition 1, 2016), improvements of school quality under the student-optimal
stable mechanism do not guarantee a better match for the school.
As a final remark, we note that even when a school improves in the students’ true preferences
and its student-optimal stable match gets better, the distribution of this school’s matches does
not get unambiguously better (in terms of first-order stochastic dominance): this is precisely what
happens with school s4 when we move from problem 2 to problem 4. Hence, even if in theory the
match is better, it may not be so in the lab.
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